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Can an agent deliberating about an action A hold a meaningful credence that she will
do A? ‘No’, say some authors, for ‘Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction’ (DCOP). Others
disagree, but we argue here that such disagreements are often terminological. We
explain why DCOP holds in a Ramseyian operationalist model of credence, but show
that it is trivial to extend this model so that DCOP fails. We then discuss a model
due to Joyce, and show that Joyce’s rejection of DCOP rests on terminological choices
about terms such as ‘intention’, ‘prediction’, and ‘belief’. Once these choices are in view,
they reveal underlying agreement between Joyce and the DCOP-favouring tradition that
descends from Ramsey. Joyce’s Evidential Autonomy Thesis (EAT) is effectively DCOP,
in different terminological clothing. Both principles rest on the so-called ‘transparency’
of first-person present-tensed reflection on one’s own mental states.
1. Introduction
Can an agent hold a meaningful credence about a contemplated action, as she
deliberates? Can she believe that it is, say, 70% probable that she will do A, while
she chooses whether to do A? Following Spohn (1977) and Levi (1989, 1996),
some writers claim that such ‘act credences’ are problematic, or even incoherent
– Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction (DCOP), as Levi puts it. Some writers take
DCOP to be almost a platitude;1 others (e.g., Ahmed, 2014; Joyce, 2002; Rabinowicz,
2002) think that the case for it is weak, or that it is clearly false.
Another recent critic of DCOP is Hájek (2016). In Liu and Price (2018) we
argue, contra Hájek, that DCOP is a special case of the so-called ‘transparency’ of
first-person present-tensed reflection on one’s own mental state. If someone asks
me whether I believed yesterday that it would rain today, I consider my evidence
(e.g., from memory) about what I believed yesterday. If someone asks me whether I
believe that it is raining now, I don’t consider my present state of belief at all, or
at least not directly. I simply consider whether it is raining. My enquiry ‘looks
1. “Probably anyone will find it absurd to assume that someone has subjective probabilities
for things which are under his control and which he can actualize as he pleases” (Spohn, 1977,
115).
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through’ the question about belief, to a question about what the belief in question
is itself about. This ‘looking through’ is transparency.
Moran (2001) explains transparency in terms of a distinction between two paths
to knowledge of one’s own mental state – a theoretical path, which is the one I use
to discover what I believed yesterday (or what another person believes); and a
deliberative path, where I learn that I now believe that it is raining by asking myself
whether it is raining (and concluding that it is). As we gloss Moran’s conclusion,
transparency rests on the fact that the deliberative path ‘crowds out’ the theoretical
path. The practical case of this is simply DCOP, or so we argue.
Or rather, it is a version of DCOP, for our conclusion comes with a crucial
qualification. Several of the relevant terms in this debate, including ‘credence’ itself,
turn out to be ill-defined. Hence authors may seem to be disagreeing about DCOP,
but simply be using terms in different ways. We give examples of how this can
happen, and how DCOP may properly be said to fail, if terms are used differently.
In the present paper we apply these two lessons – the prevalence of termi-
nological disagreements, and the relevance of transparency – to central parts of
the literature about DCOP. We focus in particular on the work of Jim Joyce, who
presents himself as a strong opponent of DCOP (especially as advocated by Levi).
We defend two conclusions. First, Joyce’s disagreement with Levi is essentially
terminological. It turns on the fact that Joyce uses terms such as ‘intention’, ‘pre-
diction’, and ‘belief’ in a different way from Levi and other supporters of DCOP.
Second, Joyce himself is committed to a principle which, like the version of DCOP
we defend in Liu and Price (2018) is a consequence of transparency. Terminological
differences aside, Joyce turns out to be a friend of DCOP, on its most interesting
and plausible reading.
Given our terminological concerns, we must be careful not to speak of the DCOP
thesis. There are several theses on offer, varying in what is meant by various crucial
terms, including ‘credence’ itself. With this in mind, we begin with one well-known
framework for understanding credence, the classical subjective decision theory
(SDT) of writers such as Ramsey and Savage. We point out that within this model
there is a clear basis for a DCOP-like thesis. This observation is not new, but it is
not as well-known as it should be, and we don’t know of any previous writers who
put its significance into the broader context that we offer here.2
As we explain, however, there are other models of credence that do admit act
credences. We give a simple example, and then explore a sophisticated model
proposed by Joyce (2002; 2007). Joyce presents himself as an opponent of DCOP.
Comparing Joyce to Ramsey, however, we shall see that the main difference is
that Joyce treats as belief-like some components of the decision process that for
Ramsey simply live in a different box altogether – in the intention box, rather than
the belief box. Both sides agree that there are such items, and that they can have
2. As we shall see, an additional advantage of starting with Ramsey is that he already has
the distinction between theoretical and deliberative enquiry that is central to Moran’s explication
of transparency, and hence to DCOP understood as a special case of transparency.
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some of the formal properties of credences – a degree and a propositional content.
The disagreement, to the extent that there is one, is about whether they deserve
to be called ‘beliefs’; and this is largely a terminological matter. (Joyce agrees
with Ramsey that there are no act credences in Ramsey’s sense during deliberation.)
Joyce’s disagreement with Levi has the same terminological character.
We don’t deny that there is room for argument about the terminological matter
in question (i.e., whether to treat intentions as a special kind of belief). But
disagreement about this matter should not be allowed to obscure a deeper point of
agreement between the two models. This point of agreement is what Joyce terms
the Evidential Autonomy Thesis (EAT): “[A] rational agent, while in the midst of her
deliberations, is in a position to legitimately ignore any evidence she might possess
about what she is likely to do,” (2007, 556–557) as Joyce puts it.
As we shall see, EAT turns out to be more fundamental than DCOP, while
embodying much of what recommends DCOP to its proponents. And it, too, turns
out to rest on transparency. We thus offer reconciliation in two senses. Not only is
Joyce’s disagreement with DCOP much shallower than he and others have assumed,
but there is wide agreement on a fundamental and closely-related feature of agency
– a feature already on the table in Ramsey, and now well articulated in Moran’s
work on transparency.
2. Ramsey’s Operational Model of Credence
Modern subjectivists understand credence, or ‘subjective probability’, in terms of
its role in rational decision making. For our purposes, we want to think of this
approach as providing a functional definition of credence – in effect, credence is
treated as a theoretical notion, which is operationally defined, along with subjective
utility, in terms of its role in producing certain specified choices. The idea of
formalising the notion of credence, or degree of belief, in this way goes back to
Frank Ramsey’s ground-breaking work ‘Truth and Probability’ (Ramsey, 1926).3
Ramsey sets out to investigate what he calls “the logic of partial belief,” and to
treat such a logic as the basis for an understanding of probability. He notes a large
obstacle in the path of this project:
It is a common view that belief and other psychological variables are
not measurable, and if this is true our inquiry will be vain; and so will
the whole theory of probability conceived as a logic of partial belief; for
if the phrase ‘a belief two-thirds of certainty’ is meaningless, a calculus
whose sole object is to enjoin such beliefs will be meaningless also.
Therefore unless we are prepared to give up the whole thing as a bad
3. Different notions of subjective probability appear earlier in, e.g., Bernoulli (1713), Laplace
(1810), De Morgan (1847), and Borel (1924). But Ramsey is usually credited as the first to provide
a systematic account of subjective probability – one of his great contributions being to show
that degrees of belief are a species of probability, so long as the agent concerned satisfies certain
coherence constraints.
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job we are bound to hold that beliefs can to some extent be measured.
(166)
But how to measure degrees of belief? Ramsey says that there are two possi-
bilities. The first, which he dismisses, is that “the degree of a belief is something
perceptible by its owner; for instance that beliefs differ in the intensity of a feeling
by which they are accompanied”. He argues instead for the second possibility:
“that the degree of a belief is a causal property of it, which we can express vaguely
as the extent to which we are prepared to act on it”. This is the idea – a functionalist
view of degree of belief, as we would now call it – that he then proceeds to develop
with characteristic alacrity.
In taking this course, Ramsey is guided by what he calls “the old-established
way of measuring a person’s belief,” which is “to propose a bet and see what are the
lowest odds which he will accept.” Ramsey finds this method to be “fundamentally
sound” (barring some deficiencies due to features like diminishing marginal utility
of money, agent’s possible disdain for gambling, etc., which can nonetheless be
dealt with by stipulating a series of postulates in the formal model).
More precisely, Ramsey considers an agent who chooses among gambles of the
form
α if p, β if ¬p.
where p is a proposition and α, β are “goods” that the agent values. The gamble
is understood in the usual sense: in accepting this gamble the agent gets α if p is
true, β otherwise. For instance, let p be “The result of next toss of this coin is head”
and α and β be some monetary rewards (or penalties). An agent who accepts this
gamble gets α if the coin lands head, β otherwise.
For notational convenience, let us write G(p, α, β) for the gamble that pays α if
p, β if ¬p. In Ramsey’s approach, we think of life as continually presenting us with
options of this kind. As he puts it, his model
is based fundamentally on betting, but this will not seem unreasonable
when it is seen that all our lives we are in a sense betting. Whenever
we go to the station we are betting that a train will really run, and if
we had not a sufficient degree of belief in this we should decline the
bet and stay at home. (183, emphasis added)
Agents are thought of as choosing to accept or reject a given bet, or choosing among
different bets, based on their degree of belief, or credence, in p and the utility they
assign to α and β.
The agent is assumed to have preferences among gambles of this form. Then,
provided that the preference relation among gambles satisfies a set of coherence
axioms, the system yields a probability function P and a utility function U (unique
up to a positive linear transformation) such that the “ultimate good” of accepting
gamble G(p, α, β) can be represented by expected utilities, that is:
EU
[
G(p, α, β)
]
= P(p)U(α) +
(
1− P(p))U(β).
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Ramsey’s theory marks the beginning of a long and fruitful development of
probabilistic subjectivism, by generations of writers. Philosophically, this approach
is motivated by the pragmatic thesis that probability is to be understood in terms
of the rational decision making that we, qua real-world agents, strive to achieve on
a day-to-day basis. Methodologically, it retains at its core Ramsey’s operationalized
model of personal probabilities (credences) and utilities. Mathematically, it is built
with rigorous representation theorems by means of which probabilities can be
numerically defined.
For our purposes, what matters is that Ramsey’s model gives us an account of
what it is to hold a credence, or degree of confidence, in a particular proposition.
The answer, holistically generated across a space of propositions, in harmony with
a simultaneous definition of utility, consists in a disposition to choose certain
gambles in preference to others.
3. Can Ramsey’s Model Make Sense of Act Credences?
Ramsey says at one point that the agent is assumed to have “certain opinions about
all propositions” (174). This cannot be quite correct, however, for there is an impor-
tant class of propositions to which his model cannot assign non-trivial credences.
To see this, consider an agent whose current options include the following gamble:
A = G(p, α, β).
What would it take, in Ramsey’s system, for this agent to have a credence in
whether she will accept A, as she decides whether or not to do so? The answer
is that the agent would need to include, in her ranked suite of possible actions,
gambles of the form:
B = G(I accept A, γ, δ). (1)
For this is the kind of gamble that is relevant to determining whether she has some
particular degree of belief in the proposition that she will accept A.
A gamble of the form of B is quite unproblematic if it is considered as a measure
of the agent’s degree of belief about whether she accepts A on some other occasion
(a future occasion, or even a past occasion, if we allow that the agent may have
forgotten whether she accepted B at some point in the past). But B makes no sense
– or at least, no sense as a measure of credence – as she decides whether to accept A.
We offer two arguments for this conclusion; we give them as informal arguments
here, and in a more formal manner in Appendix A.
3.1. Gambling on one’s own choices?
The first argument is that in a context in which an agent is considering gamble A,
offering her B simply adds to whatever is already at stake a fixed amount of γ or δ,
available to the agent for certain, depending on whether she accepts A. This may
give us some information about the agent’s psychological state – in the limit, as γ
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and δ are allowed to be large enough to dominate other considerations, it certainly
tells us whether she prefers γ to δ, or vice versa (and therefore deprives us of the
information that the choice would otherwise provide about other matters). But it
tells us nothing about any credence on the agent’s part about whether she will do
A, as she makes her choice (see Appendix A.1 for details).
We could put the point like this. At the heart of Ramsey’s model is a (formalised)
notion of choice. Agents are assumed to have unrestricted access to a range of options
– a range of gambles, each of which they may either accept or decline. Think of this
as like a bank of toggle switches: for each switch, the agent is free to set it either
on or off. The beauty of the model is to choose the gambles so that the resulting
pattern of switch settings reveals the agent’s credences over a range of propositions.
Beautiful as it is, this machinery cannot make sense of an assignment of a
credence concerning one of switch settings. The chosen switch settings are the
‘observables’ of the model, on view to the agent concerned as much as to a third
party. Until they are fixed, the entire model tells us nothing about the theoretical
variables it takes to be underneath (i.e., the agent’s credences and utilities); but
once they are fixed, there is no room in the model for uncertainty about them.
As we saw, the attempt to add a new switch representing a gamble conditional
on one of the existing switch settings simply becomes a new reward for the choice
of that switch setting. In these circumstances the agent’s choice tells us something
about their preferences,4 but nothing new of an epistemic nature. Where agents make
their own truth, choices that would otherwise reflect degrees of uncertainty have
no such significance – and there is simply no substitute, within Ramsey’s model.
It is clear that Ramsey recognised this distinction between epistemic matters,
on the one hand, and practical matters – things that are up to us – on the other. In
a later piece he says this, for example:
When we deliberate about a possible action, we ask ourselves what
will happen if we do this or that. If we give a definite answer of
the form ‘If I do p, q will result,’ this can properly be regarded as a
material implication or disjunction ‘Either not-p or q.’ But it differs, of
course, from any ordinary disjunction in that one of its members is not
something of which we are trying to discover the truth, but something it
is within our power to make true or false. (Ramsey, 1929, 142, emphasis
added)
A few lines later, Ramsey again emphasises the non-epistemic character of our
relation to propositions concerning our present options:
Besides definite answers ‘If p, q will result’, we often get ones ‘If
p, q might result’ or ‘q would probably result’. Here the degree of
probability is clearly not a degree of belief in ‘Not-p or q’, but a degree
4. Actually not even that, if the gambles are formulated in terms of goods – i.e., payoffs whose
rankings to the agent are already assumed to be known.
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of belief in q given p, which it is evidently possible to have without a
definite degree of belief in p, p not being an intellectual problem.5 (142,
emphasis added)
Finally, Ramsey also notes that the lacuna in the agent’s credences concerns only
her present actions – matters currently ‘up for decision’, as we might say. As his
footnote puts it:
It is possible to take one’s future voluntary action as an intellectual
problem: ‘Shall I be able to keep it up?’ But only by dissociating one’s
future self. (142)
3.2. Self-referential gambles
The point above was that the new gamble B – a bet on whether the agent will accept
gamble A – doesn’t do the desired job of eliciting a credence about whether the
agent will accept A. But there’s a deeper concern. It is easy to show – we do so
formally in Appendix A.2 below – that adding a gamble B of the form of (1) has
the effect of making the set of gambles on offer to the agent self-referential, in the
sense that she is effectively being offered a gamble on whether she will accept that
very same gamble. That is, it amounts to introducing a gamble of the form:
B′ = G(I accept B′, γ, δ).
To get a sense of the implications of this without explicit self-reference, suppose
that B and A are two of N gambles on offer to the agent. We can combine these
N gambles into a single gamble with 2N options, in the obvious way. Any choice
among these options fixes at the A component the very matter on which the choice
of the B component attempts to assign a credence.
The effect is that two roles in Ramsey’s model are being confused. We are
attempting to equate one of the binary-valued observableswith one of the probability-
valued theoretical terms.6 This is mathematically incoherent unless the term in
question takes only the binary values 0 or 1. And it is conceptually incoherent – a
kind of category mistake – unless we think of these trivial values as representing
simply whether the agent declines or accepts the bet in question (thus leaving
credence and belief out of the picture, in this special kind of case). There is simply
5. For future reference, we note that Ramsey’s distinction between making true and discovering
true has close affinity to themes in the work of David Velleman and Jenann Ismael, among others.
Velleman (1989) holds that agents enjoy ‘epistemic freedom’ with respect to their own actions,
and Ismael (2012) that choices are self-validating epistemic ‘wild cards’. Though they express the
idea in slightly different ways – more on these differences below – Ramsey, Velleman and Ismael
seem to have a common intuition in mind. It is of the essence of choice that it involves a kind of
epistemic singularity, a place in which the rules do not apply in the normal way. We shall return
to this thought below, and explore its development by Joyce and its connection to transparency.
6. That is, a term x such that 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. The attempt to equate these two terms is explicit in
the self-referential case. In the informal case just given, a probability-valued theoretical term is
being treated as a component of a single 2N-ary binary-valued observation term.
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no place in Ramsey’s model for a credence in the acceptance of a self-referential
gamble, except in these trivial senses – and as our argument in Appendix A.2
shows, any attempt to make sense of credence in the acceptance of a current gamble
is equivalent to the self-referential case.
To summarise, we have shown that there is no room in Ramsey’s model for
credences for currently-contemplated gambles, or actions. In other words, DCOP
holds, within Ramsey’s model, and subject to the restriction to present actions. So, success
of a kind for DCOP, but both qualifications are essential. We have just seen that
Ramsey himself allows ‘remote’ act credences; and, as we shall shortly explain, it is
a trivial matter to extend Ramsey’s model so that it allows present act credences –
i.e., so that DCOP fails completely.7
4. From Ramsey to Joyce
As we saw, the incoherence of act credences in Ramsey’s model is related to the
objection, often cited in favour of DCOP, that there is something deeply problematic
about offering an agent bets on her own actions. This objection is discussed in
a classic paper by Rabinowicz (2002), himself an opponent of DCOP. Rabinowicz
concedes that there is some merit to the argument, but suggests that it doesn’t
establish as much as the proponents of DCOP require:
In those cases when bet offers themselves would influence our prob-
abilities for the events on which the bets are made, probabilities no
longer are translatable into betting dispositions. This does not mean,
however, that probability estimates are impossible to make in cases
like this. The correct conclusion is rather that the connection between
probabilities and betting rates is not as tight as one might initially be
tempted to think. (Rabinowicz, 2002, 110)
We agree with Rabinowicz, if we interpret him simply as noting the possibility of
models that extend the Ramsey framework, to allow the existence of act credences
in circumstances in which the original framework does not.8
Indeed, the point is a rather obvious one, for here is a simple way to construct
such an extension. Imagine that our agent carries in his pocket a Personal Digital
7. Spohn (1977) and Levi (1989) argued that the standard betting interpretation of probability
collapses when it is applied to action-events. Their arguments, which involve revisions of rewards
and events in a bet, have generated heated debates regarding, among other things, what is the
“correct” way to apply the betting interpretation (cf. exchanges on this matter from Levi (2000);
Joyce (2002); Rabinowicz (2002); Levi (2007), Spohn (2012)). Gaifman (1999) provides an analysis
of self-reference and cyclic reasoning involved in decision and game theoretic models, and points
out that within the classical Bayesian subjective decision/probability theory, act credences turn
on certain conceptual circularities that cannot be rationally justified (and hence should be barred
from this framework, Gaifman argues).
8. We suspect that Rabinowicz has in mind something stronger, namely that such extensions
might be ‘more realistic’, or otherwise preferable, but we set aside that difference for now.
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Assistant, Siri, who attempts to maintain a dynamic assignment of probabilities
to a range of the agent’s possible future actions.9 Now let our hybrid model use
the agent’s own credences, where available, and Siri’s, where not. This hybrid
model can certainly assign credences to the agent’s presently-contemplated actions
– credences originating in Siri – even though the agent’s own Ramseyian model
cannot.
This trivial example makes a serious point. Anyone in these debates who, unlike
us, takes themselves to be discussing DCOP as a thesis about agents simpliciter,
rather than as about agents modelled in some particular way, would do well to ask
themselves what they mean by an ‘agent’. Without a well-motivated restriction of
the field, it will be trivially true that some agents do satisfy DCOP and others do
not, so that there is no general thesis to be had.
Are there non-trivial reasons for entertaining models that modify Ramsey’s
framework so as to admit act credences? Certainly, and to illustrate the point
we shall now turn to two motivations offered by Joyce. Joyce is a particularly
interesting case, from our point of view. He is a strong advocate of DCOP-violating
models, but he makes moves within them that have much in common with some
of the key insights of those who favour DCOP. This offers the interesting prospect
that we might be able to identify an important generic feature of agency, common
to DCOP-respecting and DCOP-violating models, and itself of considerably more
interest than the choice between such models. As we shall see, this possibility turns
on the fact that Joyce is not so much extending Ramsey’s model, as in the Siri case,
but relabelling it, by treating as ‘belief-like’ some elements that are present in a
Ramseyian model, but classified in a different way.
4.1. Joyce on the role of act credences
Characterising his own version of Causal Decision Theory (CDT), Joyce notes that it
“requires deliberating agents to make predictions about their own actions.” (Joyce,
2002, 69) He notes that Levi maintains that such a decision theory is “incoherent
because ‘deliberation crowds out prediction.’” (ibid.) In response, Joyce defends the
following conclusion:
[T]he ability of a decision maker to adopt beliefs about her own acts
during deliberation is essential to any plausible account of human
agency and freedom. While Levi suggests that a deliberating agent can-
not see herself as free with respect to acts she tries to predict, precisely
the reverse is true. Though they play no part in the rationalization of
9. Siri does this in an attempt to keep her agent out of trouble, and is able to do it effectively
because she has access to the traditional sources of evidence – the agent’s entire history of,
for instance, ‘Likes’ and ‘Dislikes’ on Facebook, dinner reservations on Opentable, purchasing
history on Amazon, and so on. One of the challenges for proponents of DCOP is to explain why
the agent himself cannot use such information to generate credences about his own choices, as
he makes them – more on this below.
9
Yang Liu and Huw Price
actions, such beliefs to are essential to the agent’s understanding of the
causal genesis of her behavior. (70)
Joyce thus presents himself as an opponent of DCOP. However, he provides a
helpful summary of arguments in favour of DCOP – as he puts it, “some general
worries that one might have about letting agents assign probabilities to their own
acts”:
Worry-1: Allowing act probabilities might make it permissible for
agents to use the fact that they are likely (or unlikely) to perform
an act as a reason for performing it.
Worry-2: Allowing act probabilities might destroy the distinction be-
tween acts and states that is central to most decision theories.
Worry-3: Allowing act probabilities “multiplies entities needlessly” by
introducing quantities that play no role in decision making. (79)
In each case, Joyce expresses sympathy for the concern, but argues that DCOP is
not required in order to meet it. Thus:
As to Worry-1, I entirely agree that it is absurd for an agent’s views
about the advisability of performing any act to depend on how likely
she takes that act to be. Reasoning of the form “I am likely (unlikely) to
A, so I should A” is always fallacious. While one might be tempted to
forestall it by banishing act probabilities altogether, this is unnecessary.
We run no risk of sanctioning fallacious reasoning as long as A’s
probability does not figure into the calculation of its own expected
utility, or that of any other act. (79–80)
Note that Ramsey’s model does not allow anything other than “banishing act
probabilities altogether”, as Joyce puts it here. In effect, Joyce is agreeing that
self-referential gambles are incoherent, and proposing to understand ‘credence’
so that act credences do not commit us to such gambles. But for Ramsey there is
no such option – credences are defined in terms of gambles, and in the case of act
credences that would require the kind of self-referential gambles that Joyce agrees
to be absurd. (It is not clear that the absurdity Joyce has in mind is precisely the
one we identified in §3 – arguably, it can’t be, for Joyce takes it to obtain even in
his non-Ramseyian models. We return to this issue in §5.)
Similarly, concerning Worry-2, Joyce concludes:
Even if act probabilities do not figure into the calculation of act utilities,
they may have other roles to play in the process of rational decision
making. Indeed, we shall soon see that they do. (80)
Again, concerning a presentation by Levi of the apparent unmeasurability of act
credences within SDT, Joyce says:
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It is quite true that the probabilities [an agent] assigns to acts during
her deliberations cannot be elicited using wagers in the usual way, but
this does not show that they are incoherent, only that they are difficult
to measure. (86–87)
Finally, Joyce makes similar remarks about Worry-3:
As Wolfgang Spohn has long argued, there is no reason to allow act
probabilities in decision theory if we cannot find anything useful
for them to do. Given that they play no role in the evaluation or
justification of acts, it would seem that there is nothing useful for them
to do. Why not abolish them? (98)
Joyce responds as follows:
Act probabilities are a kind of epiphenomena in decision theory. Though
they do no real explanatory work, they are tied to things that do. We
need act probabilities because (i) we need unconditional subjective
probabilities for decisions about acts to causally explain action (though
not to rationalize it), and (ii) we need Efficacy to explain what it is for
an agent to regard acts as being under her control. Efficacy requires
that P(A\dA) = P(¬A\d¬A) = 1, and so P(A/dA) = P(¬A/d¬A) = 1.
One cannot have these latter conditional probabilities and uncondi-
tional probabilities for dA and d¬A without also having unconditional
probabilities for A and ¬A. Act probabilities are not only coherent,
they are compulsory if we are to adequately explain rational agency. We
cannot outlaw them without jettisoning other subjective probabilities
that are essential ingredients in the causal processes that result in
deliberate actions. When it comes to beliefs about one’s own actions,
deliberation does not “crowd out” prediction; it mandates it! (98–99)
This will take a little unpacking. First, it is important to note that Joyce is
distinguishing between an agent’s decision to do A, written dA, and the act A
itself. When he talks of act probabilities, he means P(A) and P(¬A), not P(dA)
and P(d¬A). This is another potential source of talking at cross purposes – some
proponents of DCOP may take it for granted that the important issue concerns the
latter credences, not the former.
Fortunately this distinction doesn’t matter much in this context, because Joyce
is equally committed to the need for unconditional probabilities of both kinds,
P(A) and P(dA). They are connected by the principle Efficacy, which Joyce takes to
encode the idea that the agent takes A to be under her control – if she chooses dA
then A results, and similarly for d¬A and ¬A.
Let us grant Joyce that, as he puts it here, “Efficacy requires that P(A\dA) =
P(¬A\d¬A) = 1, and so P(A/dA) = P(¬A/d¬A) = 1.”10 It certainly follows that if
10. In Joyce’s notation P(A/B) is the conditional probability of A given B. The backslash in
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we allow unconditional probabilities P(dA) and P(d¬A) then we shall have to allow
P(A) and P(¬A), as well. But why do these conditional claims require unconditional
probabilities in the first place?
We see two possible answers at this point. The first, which we are not sure
whether to attribute to Joyce, is that the conditional probabilities are defined
in terms of unconditional probabilities, so that we cannot have P(A/dA) and
P(¬A/d¬A) without having P(dA) and P(d¬A) as well. This is a very familiar
move, and needs to be mentioned as a motivation for extending Ramseyian SDT to
add unconditional act credences. But it also admits a well-known reply, namely,
that there are other reasons for treating conditional probability as primitive, and
not defining it as the usual ratio of unconditional probabilities. Ramsey himself
favoured this approach. In a passage we quoted above, he refers to one’s “degree of
belief in q given p, which it is evidently possible to have without a definite degree
of belief in p” (1929, 142, and see also his 1926, 180). Later proponents include
Renyi (1970), Price (1986b), Mellor (1993), and Hájek (2003).
Whether or not Joyce has this consideration in mind, his main point is a
different one. He proposes a detailed model of the deliberative process in which
the credences P(dA) and P(d¬A) play a crucial role. As he notes, the model owes
much to Velleman. From Joyce’s point of view the attractions of this model provide
the strongest case for accepting P(dA) and P(d¬A), and hence for rejecting DCOP.
Accordingly, we want to follow Joyce’s explication of the model in some detail. It
is crucial to our claim that (apparent) disagreements about DCOP are obscuring
deeper agreement about the nature of agency.
4.2. Joyce on “evidential autonomy”
Joyce introduces his discussion of the model in question by articulating yet another
concern about act credences:
I am portraying the agent who changes her mind as altering her beliefs
about what she will decide on the basis of no evidence whatever. She goes
from being certain that she has decided on ¬A to being certain that
she has decided on A without learning anything. Can this sort of belief
change be rational? By letting agents assign subjective probabilities to
their own acts it seems that we are also letting them believe whatever
they want about them. This means that act probabilities must be
radically unlike other probabilities in that they seem not to be at all
constrained by the believer’s evidence. . . . This, I suspect, gets us to
what is really bothering people about act probabilities. (2002, 94–95)
In response, Joyce notes first that when an agent
‘P(A\dA)’ represents what Joyce calls ‘’causal probability’ – “it represents [the agent’s] beliefs
about what her acts will causally promote, so that P(S\A) will exceed P(S\¬A) only if [the agent]
believes that A will causally promote S.” (79)
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sees herself as a free agent in the matter of A, Efficacy ensures that all
of her evidence about A comes by way of evidence about her decisions.
Her justification for claiming that she will do A will always have the
form: “here is such-and-such evidence that I will decide on A, and (via
Efficacy) deciding on it will cause me to do it.” (95)
As Joyce says, this may seem “to push the problem back from beliefs about acts to
beliefs about decisions.” But he argues that “this is not so”:
An agent’s beliefs about her own decisions have a property that most
other beliefs lack: under the right conditions they are self-fulfilling, so
that if the agent has them then they are true. Understanding this is one
of the keys to understanding human agency and freedom. (95)
Joyce explains this point with reference to Velleman’s notion of epistemic
freedom:
According to Velleman, . . . the believer has a kind of “epistemic free-
dom” with respect to self-fulfilling beliefs that she lacks for her other
opinions; she can justifiably believe whatever she wants about them.
If she is sure that believing H will make H true and that believing
¬H will make ¬H true then, no matter what other evidence she might
possess, she is at liberty to believe either H or ¬H because she knows
that whatever opinion she adopts will be warranted by the evidence she
will acquire as a result of adopting it. More generally, any increase or
decrease in her confidence in H provides her with evidence in favor
of that increase or decrease – the stronger a self-fulfilling belief is, the
more evidence one has in its favor. (96)
Like Velleman, Joyce sees this idea of self-fulfilling belief as crucial to a proper
understanding of agency: “Velleman holds, as I do, that agents are epistemically
free with respect to their own decisions and intentions. . . . [T]he idea that agents
are epistemically free regarding their own decisions is important and entirely
correct.” (96–97)
Finally, Joyce applies these ideas to offer a model of the dynamics of deliberation:
During the course of her deliberations [an agent’s] confidence in “I
decide to do A” will wax or wane in response to information about A’s
desirability relative to her other options (e.g., information about expected
utilities). If A and ¬A seem equally desirable at some point in the
process, then she will be equally confident of dA and d¬A at that time.
If further deliberation leads her to see A as the better option, then her
confidence in dA will increase as her confidence in d¬A decreases.
These deliberations will ordinarily cease when [the agent] is certain
of either dA or d¬A, at which point she will have made her decision
about whether or not to perform A by making up her mind what to believe
about dA. (97)
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Joyce notes that while
this process would be nothing more than an exercise in wishful think-
ing if [the agent’s] beliefs about dA and d¬A were not self-fulfilling,
the fact that they are ensures that her subjective probability for each
proposition increases or decreases in proportion to the evidence she
has in its favor. (97)
He concludes: “This explains how [the agent’s] beliefs about what she will decide
can be both responsive to her preferences and warranted by her evidence at each
moment of her deliberations.” (97)
Joyce returns to these ideas in a later piece (Joyce, 2007), links them to a point
made by writers on both sides of debates between causal and evidential decision
theory, and introduces EAT:
[M]any decision theorists (both evidential and causal) have suggested
that free agents can legitimately ignore evidence about their own acts.
Judea Pearl (a causalist) has written that while “evidential decision
theory preaches that one should never ignore genuine statistical evi-
dence . . . [but] actions – by their very definition – render such evidence
irrelevant to the decision at hand, for actions change the probabilities
that acts normally obey.” (2000, p. 109) . . .
Huw Price (an evidentialist) has expressed similar sentiments:
“From the agent’s point of view contemplated actions are always consid-
ered to be sui generis, uncaused by external factors . . . This amounts to
the view that free actions are treated as probabilistically independent
of everything except their effects.” (1993, p. 261) A view somewhat
similar to Price’s can be found in Hitchcock (1996).
These claims are basically right: a rational agent, while in the midst
of her deliberations, is in a position to legitimately ignore any evidence
she might possess about what she is likely to do. . . . A deliberating
agent who regards herself as free need not proportion her beliefs about
her own acts to the antecedent evidence that she has for thinking that
she will perform them. Let’s call this the evidential autonomy thesis.
(Joyce, 2007, 556–557)
Joyce adds a footnote at this point:
It is important to understand that this freedom only extends to propo-
sitions that describe actions about which the agent is currently deliber-
ating, and whose performance she sees as being exclusively a matter
of the outcome of her decision. It does not, for example, apply to acts
that will be the result of future deliberations. (557)
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4.3. Comparing Joyce and Ramsey
We are now in a position to appreciate that there are deep similarities between
Joyce’s model and Ramsey’s. Ramsey does not admit credences for dA and d¬A,
though with precisely the same qualification articulated in the footnote from Joyce
just quoted: the restriction only applies in the context of current deliberations. For
Ramsey, the rejection of such credences seems a conceptual matter, as well as a
consequence of his operational account of credence. The truth of dA and d¬A is
simply “not . . . an intellectual problem,” as he puts it – “not something of which
we are trying to discover the truth, but something it is within our power to make
true or false.” (1929, 142, emphasis added)
In fact, however, only a hair’s breadth separates this view from Joyce’s. Joyce,
too, agrees that the truth of dA and d¬A is not an intellectual problem of the
normal sort, and that these propositions are within our power to make true or false.
He simply represents this special status in a different way. For Joyce, there is a
belief during deliberation, albeit one with a special epistemic status (because it is
self-fulfilling). For Ramsey there is no belief until it is licensed by the formation of
an intention (or volition, as Ramsey himself puts it), either to dA or d¬A – in other
words, until after deliberation. But this is little more than a stylistic preference, at
least compared to the points of agreement.
In particular, the (apparent) disagreement between Ramsey and Joyce reflects a
difference about the use of the term ‘belief’. Ramsey is taking for granted what we
might call an epistemically-grounded conception of belief (and hence of partial belief,
or credence). On this conception, as in the standard Bayesian picture, beliefs and
credences are only acquired, changed, or updated in the light of new evidence – it
is a conceptual truth about beliefs that they are responsive to evidence in this way.
One common correlate of this idea is the thesis that beliefs have ‘world-to-mind
direction of fit’ (see, e.g., Humberstone 1992). Nothing counts as a belief unless, in
some appropriately normative sense, it is ‘trying’ to match the world.
Intentions don’t fit this pattern. As Anscombe (1957) famously pointed out,
intentions have mind-to-world direction of fit. For Ramsey, then, intentions don’t
count as beliefs, or partial beliefs, or credences. Ramsey will allow that we have
beliefs about our own actions, of course, but they are downstream of intentions.
When one forms the intention to A, one thereby acquires evidence that one will A
(at least in normal cases), and may thereby come to believe that one will A. But
the intention itself is not such a belief, according to this epistemically-grounded
conception of belief.
In contrast, Joyce, following Velleman, thinks of the intentions we form when
we deliberate as beliefs – reflexive beliefs about what we ourselves will do. This is
why beliefs about one’s own action are, as Joyce says, “essential” to his model of
deliberation. In Joyce’s model the products of the process of deliberation – gradually-
strengthening intentions to do something – just are such beliefs. Unlike other beliefs,
however, these particular beliefs are self-fulfilling and not responsive to evidence
of the usual sort – that’s what EAT tells us.
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There are two ways to get to Joyce’s view from Ramsey’s. One is to modify the
epistemically-grounded conception of belief to allow a special class of exceptions,
a special class of beliefs whose genesis does not require evidence – namely, the
self-justifying beliefs that Joyce identifies with intentions. The other is to stretch the
notion of evidence just enough to allow that these special beliefs are supported by
evidence after all – self-supported, in effect, by the evidence that they themselves
generate or constitute. Whichever way we stretch our terminology, the principle
that beliefs have world-to-mind direction of fit gets a little bit stretched, too, but
again with the reassurance that these are special cases. Joyce himself is clear that
they are special cases. As he remarks: “act probabilities must be radically unlike
other probabilities.” (2002, 94)
By way of comparison, here is Jenann Ismael’s negotiation of the same termi-
nological boundary, with Wittgenstein in Ramsey’s shoes and Ismael herself in
Joyce’s:11
Wittgenstein . . . thinks that for [one’s own intentions] to count as
knowledge, they would have to be subject to the game of certainty
and doubt, and that it would have to make sense to doubt their truth.
And so for him, these cannot count as genuine knowledge. On the
performative model,12 they are still knowledge, but degenerate because
self-fulfilling. Whereas Wittgenstein is suspicious of the idea of knowl-
edge free of epistemic constraints, the performative model explains it
and uses it to understand how it shapes the first-person/third-person
asymmetries in predictive opinion. Both of us agree that it is wrong to
see the sort of certainty we have about our own beliefs on the model
of Cartesian transparency based in an introspective faculty. But the
performative model provides an alternative that secures the special
epistemic status and integrates it neatly with other truth-bearing dis-
course without undermining its status as knowledge. (Ismael, 2012,
158–159)
In this case, as for Ramsey and Joyce, it is clear that the two views in question
are extremely close, easily mapped from one to the other with small variations in
terminology. Some readers may feel that there is an interesting question whether the
Ramsey/Wittgenstein model or the Joyce/Ismael model comes closer to getting the
psychology of decision right, but for our purposes what matters are the similarities.
The crucial point of agreement is that the fact that supports DCOP in Ramsey’s
model – i.e., that in the process of deliberation we come to beliefs about what we
will do after but not before we form our intention – is mirrored under a different
name in Joyce’s picture. For Joyce, it is simply EAT itself, which implies that the
11. Ismael notes the similarity between her view and Joyce’s: “James Joyce comes to much
the same conclusion . . . . He writes ‘an agent’s beliefs about her own decisions are self-fulfilling,
and that this can be used to explain away the seeming paradoxical features of act probabilities.’”
(Ismael, 2012, 156)
12. This is Ismael’s label for the view that decisions are self-fulfilling beliefs.
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beliefs about our own actions that play the role of intentions are not themselves
evidentially ‘downstream’ of other beliefs.
Whichever model we choose, deliberation crowds out something. For Ramsey,
as we have seen, “making true” crowds out the ordinary evidential process of
“discovering true”. For Joyce it also crowds out the ordinary evidential process of
discovering true, but in favour of an extraordinary process of this kind – a process
that is construed as generating its own evidence for the discovery in question. And
EAT holds in both models, with a similar terminological shift: in Ramsey’s case
the products of deliberation are evidentially autonomous because they are simply
the wrong kind of psychological state to be evidentially constrained. Modulo this
terminological difference, the two models are isomorphic.
Similarly for Joyce’s ‘disagreement’ with Levi: as we saw, Joyce says that
“[w]hile Levi suggests that a deliberating agent cannot see herself as free with
respect to acts she tries to predict, precisely the reverse is true.” (2002, 70) Because
Joyce interpets intentions as beliefs, he understands deliberation as a process of
coming to beliefs about what one will do – coming to predict what one will do, in
fact. But Levi would not deny (obviously!) that a free agent can form intentions,
and hence ‘try to predict’ her own actions in Joyce’s sense of term. To make sense of
Levi’s claim we must read him as using ‘predict’ in the more restricted Ramseyian
sense, of a credence based on (non-degenerate) evidence. Levi denies that a
deliberating agent can make prediction in that sense about her contemplated action,
and Joyce agrees. (For him this is EAT, effectively.) Terminological disagreements
aside, in other words, Joyce is not disagreeing with Levi – on the contrary.13
4.4. Beyond EAT
To put this irenic diagnosis in context, we want to note that for EAT, as for DCOP,
it is a trivial matter to find models of cognitive systems acting in the world that do
not satisfy this principle. Our Siri-enhanced Ramseyian agent again provides an
example. In that case, Siri does “proportion her beliefs about her [agent’s] acts to
the antecedent evidence that she [Siri] has for thinking that [her agent] will perform
them” (to paraphrase Joyce’s own statement of EAT). So if we think of Siri and her
agent as a kind of composite, extended agent, we do get a formal violation of EAT.
13. To simplify the above discussion we have ignored the fact that like Skyrms (1990),
Joyce (2012) offers a stepwise model of decision-making, in which partially-formed intentions
progress towards a full intention. Given that he interprets intentions as beliefs about the
conteemplated action, these partial intentions are represented as act credences – hence the core
role of act credences in his model. This makes no essential difference to our argument that
Joyce’s disagreement with Levi and Ramsey is terminological, but it does introduce a new source
of potential terminological confusion. We should not mix up deliberation in the sense of the
entire multi-step process with deliberation in the sense of the process at each step whereby
the agent updates her partial intention. As we noted above, Ramsey can quite well allow act
credences formed in the light of formation of an intention. This will introduce act credences
into a multi-step process, even if intentions themselves are not represented as credences. But it
won’t touch Ramsey’s distinction between making true and discovering true, at the locus of the
individual steps.
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Defenders of EAT are likely to reply that such composites do not deserve to be
called agents (or not just agents – perhaps the addition of Siri produces an extended
mind, one submodule of which is properly called an agent). We have considerable
sympathy for this viewpoint, but have no need to defend it here. We mention the
example for two reasons. First, we want to reiterate our earlier observation that the
kind of issues we have been discussing involve a great deal of model-relativity. It is
helpful to think about one’s terms. But second, we do think it plausible that EAT
marks an important boundary, and take ourselves to be agreeing with both Ramsey
and Joyce on this point.
However, our main claim is that DCOP as such does not mark such a boundary
in these matters. To paraphrase Sayre’s Law, it may be that the reason that debates
about DCOP seem so intractable is that there is nothing of significance at stake.
5. Why EAT?
Where does EAT itself come from? We want to conclude by proposing an answer:
in a word, transparency. This will reinforce our conclusion that Ramsey and Joyce
are really on the same page, and show what must be denied by anyone who wants
to disagree. We’ll introduce this diagnosis by raising a further puzzle about Joyce’s
view.
5.1. Queries for Joyce
As we saw, Joyce formulates EAT as follows:
A deliberating agent who regards herself as free need not proportion
her beliefs about her own acts to the antecedent evidence that she has
for thinking that she will perform them. (2007, 557)
But why is this so, and precisely when is it so? Compare the case of a coin toss.
Imagine a coin that says ‘The result is Heads’ on one side and ‘The result is Tails’
on the other. Whichever statement turns out to be visible when the coin is tossed is
self-justifying, but that doesn’t stand in the way of our having evidence about the
result in advance, let alone give us grounds to ignore such evidence, at that point.
Is deliberation different, according to EAT (and Joyce)? In the coin toss, too, we
needn’t apportion our beliefs after the toss to the antecedent evidence, but that isn’t
news.
If there is to be something distinctive about the case of free action, not present
in the coin toss case, EAT needs to apply either before the choice, or somehow during
the choice. The latter possibility seems to make most sense, from Joyce’s point of
view. Choice is a matter of adopting a belief about what one will do, in Joyce’s
model. Read this way, EAT tells us that adoption of belief during the process of choice
isn’t constrained by prior evidence. (The coin toss analogy now works in Joyce’s
favour. The statement on display after the toss is entirely justified, even if the
antecedent evidence made it very unlikely.)
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But what is Joyce’s view about an agent’s “beliefs about her own acts” at
the beginning of the process of choice? Does she take over credences based on
antecedent evidence about how she will act, or does EAT already rule that out?
(When does the EATing start, as it were?) There may be a clue in Joyce’s remark
that act credences cannot be reasons for acting:
[I]t is absurd for an agent’s views about the advisability of performing
any act to depend on how likely she takes that act to be. Reasoning of
the form “I am likely (unlikely) to A, so I should A” is always fallacious.
On the face of it, this suggests that Joyce allows that an agent can hold act credences
right at the beginning of a deliberation, but thinks that it would be absurd to take
credences as reasons for one’s choice. But why should that be so? Thinking that I
am likely to do A, I choose to do so in order to confirm my own present prediction.
That’s a somewhat ‘self-satisfied’ reason, perhaps, but what makes it absurd?
It might seem that the absurdity follows from EAT. In virtue of EAT, the beliefs
formed during deliberation cannot be evidentially constrained by prior evidence.
Once I have chosen to A, my reason for thinking that I will A is that I have formed
the self-validating belief that I will A, and prior evidence is irrelevant, at this point.
But this can’t be right diagnosis. When Joyce says that “[r]easoning of the form
‘I am likely (unlikely) to A, so I should A’ is always fallacious,” he isn’t talking
about an epistemic fallacy, or a mistaken piece of evidential reasoning. Joyce’s remark
is about reasons for acting. Whichever belief I choose (in Joyce’s model), it will be
self-validating, but presumably I can have non-epistemic reasons for choosing one
action rather than another. Joyce’s claim here is that an act credence can’t be a
reason of that non-epistemic sort.
Perhaps EAT is doing the work indirectly? In virtue of EAT, pre-deliberation
act credences are liable to be ‘evidentially unstable’ – an unreliable guide to future
credence on the same matter, as it were. EAT ensures that there is no epistemic
constraint that requires that post-choice act credences align with pre-choice act
credences. So treating a pre-deliberative act credence as a reason would be sitting on
a stool one of the legs of which is liable to collapse under your weight – guaranteed
to collapse, perhaps, in the sense that EAT ensures that the pre-choice act credence
carries no authority whatsoever, after the choice is made.
Indeed, if we were to allow pre-choice act credences to be reasons they would
be liable to undermine themselves before the choice ever got to be made. If my
pre-choice credence that I will do A feeds into my decision to do A, then in arriving
at that credence I acquire new evidence relevant to whether I will do A – I learn
of a new reason relevant to my choice. But this is liable to change my pre-choice
credence. At the very least, it means that there is new evidence for me to consider.14
14. Ismael (2012, 160) notes that Jonathan Bennett makes a similar point about the instability
of predictions about our own behaviour, while we deliberate. Price’s (1986a, 1991) defence of
Evidential Decision Theory relies on a similar instability argument, motivated by the Principle of
Total Evidence. And Gaifman (1999) highlights a similar phenomenon of instability in Bayesian
decision and game theory through his analysis of the Cassandra’s paradox.
19
Yang Liu and Huw Price
These considerations are moving in the right direction, but they don’t get to the
heart of the matter. What we need is an explanation for the fact that pre-choice act
credences cannot be attached to the deliberative stool in the first place. We propose
that such an explanation – indeed, an explanation for EAT itself – can be found in
the cognitive phenomenon known as transparency. We turn to some key points
from Moran’s (2001) explication of this notion.15
5.2. Moran on transparency
Moran describes transparency like this:
Ordinarily, if a person asks himself the question “Do I believe that
P?,” he will treat this much as he would a corresponding question that
does not refer to him at all, namely, the question “Is P true?” And
this is not how he will normally relate himself to the question of what
someone else believes. Roy Edgley [1969] has called this feature the
“transparency” of one’s own thinking. (2001, §2.6)
He offers the following diagnosis of the phenomenon:
[W]hat . . . transparency requires is the deferral of the theoretical ques-
tion “What do I believe?” to the deliberative question “What am I
to believe?” And in the case of the attitude of belief, answering a
deliberative question is a matter of determining what is true. (62-3)
This diagnosis involves a distinction between two epistemic stances on one’s own
mind, a distinction that Moran describes like this:
In characterizing two sorts of questions one may direct toward one’s
state of mind, the term ‘deliberative’ is best seen at this point in contrast
to ‘theoretical,’ the primary point being to mark the difference between
that inquiry which terminates in a true description of my state, and
one which terminates in the formation or endorsement of an attitude.
(63)
Moreover, Moran takes the lessons of transparency to apply equally to delibera-
tion about what to avow and deliberation about what to do. As he puts it:
[W]e might . . . compare the case of belief with that of knowledge of
one’s own future behavior: a person may have a purely predictive basis
for knowing what he will do, but in the normal situation of free action
it is on the basis of his decision that he knows what he is about to
do. In deciding what to do, his gaze is directed “outward,” on the
15. We present Moran’s views at greater length in Liu and Price (2018). For another discussion
of transparency and its relevance to an understanding of the agent’s perspective, we recommend
Ismael (2012).
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considerations in favor of some course of action, on what he has most
reason to do. Thus his stance toward the question, “What am I going to
do now?” is transparent to a question about what he is to do, answered
by the “outward-looking” consideration of what is good, desirable, or
feasible to do. (105)
For action, as for belief, Moran emphasises that transparency does not mean
that the agent does not have knowledge of her own state of mind. The point is
rather that that knowledge comes from a distinctive source, only available in the
first-person present-tensed case – via a deliberative path, rather than a theoretical or
empirical path, as Moran puts it. The last passage continues:
When [the agent] answers this question [i.e., “What am I going to do
now?”] for himself and announces what he is going to do, . . . [w]hat
he has gained, and what his statement expresses, is straightforward
knowledge about a particular person [i.e., himself], knowledge that
can be told and thus transferred to another person who needs to know
what he will do. (105-6)
Borrowing a term from our own context, we might characterise Moran’s conclusion
as being that from the first-person present-tensed perspective, the deliberative path
to knowledge crowds out the theoretical path (though the content of the knowledge
achieved is precisely the same).
5.3. From transparency to evidential autonomy
Let us now apply these ideas to our own discussion. In the section before last we
were looking for a justification for the thesis (required by Joyce’s claim that “it is
absurd for an agent’s views about the advisability of performing any act to depend
on how likely she takes that act to be”) that a pre-deliberative act credence cannot
be a reason for the action in question. As we put it there, why can’t pre-deliberative
act credences support the deliberative stool?
Transparency gives us an answer. In effect, it implies that deliberation turns
the stool upside down. It makes our knowledge of what we will do rest on the
deliberative seat, and not vice versa. What is absurd about taking act credences
to be reasons is that during deliberation, deliberation itself is the source of one’s
act credences. At this point, trying to take an act credence to be a reason is simply
putting the cart before the horse – one needs one’s reasons in order to generate one’s
act credences.16
More generally, Moran’s distinction between two paths to knowledge of our-
selves – the theoretical path and deliberative path – offers us a straightforward
16. True, one might take the memory of a pre-deliberative credence to provide a reason – I’m
doing it because I predicted that I would, and I want to prove myself right. But here the reason
is not the prior credence itself, but the belief that one previously held that credence. We are
mentioning the credence, not using it, so to speak.
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explanation of EAT itself. EAT simply rests on the fact that when we embark on the
deliberative path, we set aside the theoretical path. That’s the core of transparency.
Indeed, this diagnosis suggests that Joyce’s own formulation of EAT is a little
too weak. As Joyce expresses it, EAT is this principle:
A deliberating agent who regards herself as free need not proportion
her beliefs about her own acts to the antecedent evidence that she has
for thinking that she will perform them. (2007, 557, emphasis added)
This suggests a picture in which the antecedent evidence is still sitting there,
as it were, but the agent simply has the option of ignoring it, in deciding to
proportion her beliefs about her own acts. Moran’s picture is more exclusive,
and less voluntary. By deliberating, we move ourselves out of the evidential space
altogether. In particular, the agent doesn’t have the option of not ignoring the
evidence, because she is no longer playing the evidential game, no longer following
the theoretical path.
Once again, various terminological options present themselves at this point.
Joyce may prefer to say that the agent doesn’t leave evidential space altogether,
but rather enters a special kind of evidential space (one in which she calls the
evidential shots, so to speak). Again, we want to bracket these terminological
issues, in order to focus on the underlying structural bifurcation that seems agreed
on all sides. This is that deliberation involves a distinctive path to knowledge of
our own present choices – a path that takes precedence over, indeed ‘crowds out’,
the theoretical path that we rely on in third person and non-present-tensed cases.
This bifurcation, or separation between two paths to knowledge of our own
actions, is what transparency explains. (Indeed, if Moran is right, it is simply the
special practical case of something more general.) We propose that it is the source
of EAT, and at the heart of what is correct about DCOP. As promised, Joyce turns
out to be a friend of this version of DCOP, once terminological differences are set
to one side.
A. Appendix
Here we present the formal versions of the two arguments given in §3.
A.1. A gamble on another gamble is not a display of credence
Consider, for simplicity, the case where the agent has only two gambles to choose
from, namely A = G(p, α, β) and B = G(I accept A, γ, δ) as formulated in §3. Now
suppose that the agent’s credence on proposition p is rp and, for reductio, her
credence on ‘I accept A’ is rA. Then, given her options, the possible consequences
the agent may end up with as results of her actions are A&B, ¬A&B, A&¬B, and
¬A&¬B (cf. Table 1 where ‘A&¬B’ reads “I accept A but reject B,” and so on.).
It is plain that, in this case, the decision problem reduces to a simple choice
problem among different consequences of her actions. Then, the agent should just
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Table 1
act utility value
A&B γ+ EU(A) = γ+ [rpα+ (1− rp)β]
¬A&B δ
A&¬B EU(A) = rpα+ (1− rp)β
¬A&¬B 0
act in a manner that maximizes her gain. But such choices tell us nothing about
any credence on the agent’s part about whether she will do A – the act-credence rA
has nothing to do with the situation.
A.2. Gambling on gambles leads to self-referential gambles
There is a deeper objection to using gambles of the form of (1) to elicit credences
about an agent’s own actions, in the context in which those actions are under
consideration. This is because any gamble of the form of (1) – gambles whose
formulation involves act-propositions that describe the agent’s available options –
is equivalent to a gamble whose determination contains references to itself.
To see this, let’s use our running example in Section A.1 above where the agent
is offered two gambles, namely A = G(p, α, β) and B = G(I accept A, γ, δ). As
before, the agent has four options: A&B, A&¬B, ¬A&B, and ¬A&¬B. Suppose that
the agent’s credence on “I accept A” is such that 0 < rA < 1.17 Write gamble B in
its original form:
B = γ if I accept A; δ if I reject A. (2)
Now, given the agent’s available options, the case ‘I reject A’ can be distinguished
into two subcases, namely ‘I reject A but not B’ and ‘I reject both A and B’. Similarly,
the case ‘I accept A’ can be further distinguished into two subcases, namely ‘I accept
only A but not B’ and ‘I accept both A and B’. Then (2) takes the form under these
subdivisions as:
B =γ1 if I accept both A and B, γ2 if I accept A but not B;
δ1 if I reject A but not B, δ2 if I reject both A and B,
(3)
where γ1 and γ2 are payoffs under actions A&B and A&¬B respectively, and
similarly for δ1 and δ2 (in our running example, these values accord well with the
ones in Table 1.) Further, the act credence rA, if exists, can be partitioned into rA∧B
and rA∧¬B; and, similarly, r¬A(= 1− rA) into r¬A∧B and r¬A∧¬B.
17. Unless we are prepared to say that act credences like rA are strictly a zero-or-one matter
(i.e., rA = 0 or 1), which reduces the current decision problem to choices among different payoffs
as presented in the last subsection. Otherwise we are left with the option of assuming the
existence of non-trivial credence 0 < rA < 1.
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Notice that the first and the third term of (3) are subcases of ‘I accept B’, and
the second and the fourth term are subcases of ‘I reject B’. We can then regroup
them and recast (3) as follows:
B = γ′ if I accept B; δ′ if I reject B. (4)
This yields a self-referential gamble B = G(I accept B, γ′, δ′), whose conditions of
determination refer to its own acceptance or rejection. And this gamble is to be
represented in the current model by:
EU(B) = γ′rB + δ′r¬B (5)
where rB = rA∧B + r¬A∧B and r¬B = rA∧¬B + r¬A∧¬B.
It is easy to see that the above argument can be generalized to be applied to
cases with more than two options. The argument shows that from any gamble of
the form of (2) one can always recover a self-referential gamble of the form of (4).
In other words, any gamble like B = G(I accept A, γ, δ) is a self-referential gamble
in disguise!
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